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The paper examines the impact of uncertainty on the decision problem of an
international firm. The uncertainty under which the firm decides on home and
foreign supply is affected by an information system that conveys public signals
about the random spot exchange rate. The transparency in the foreign exchange
market is defined by the informativeness of the information system. Our notion
of transparency thus proposes an information-based concept of uncertainty. In
this setting, we revisit the link between the transparency in the foreign exchange
market and the behavior of the international firm. While more transparency
may lead to higher or lower domestic sales and foreign exports, we show that
the firm’s expected profits always go up. The welfare of domestic consumers,
by contrast, may increase or decrease with higher transparency in the foreign
exchange market.
1 Introduction
The extensive literature on the optimal choice under uncertainty has shown that, in general,
the impact of uncertainty on the behavior of risk-averse decision makers is ambiguous. In
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particular, risk aversion alone is insufficient to assess the marginal impact of uncertainty
on production and investment. This ambiguity also applies to the behavior of international
firms acting in global markets (Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Kawai and Zilcha, 1986; Wong,
2003).
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the precise meaning of uncertainty,
and the right way to model it, is not beyond dispute in the literature. With regard to
global markets and international trade, it appears that uncertainty cannot appropriately be
captured by standard dispersion concepts such as variances, mean preserving spreads, or
other variability orders (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994). Our paper therefore proposes
an information-based concept of uncertainty and, in this setting, revisits the link between
exchange rate risk and firm behavior regarding international trade.
In standard models under price or exchange rate risk, firms acts in an exogenously given
uncertain environment. Yet, viewed from a broader perspective, the uncertainty under
which production for domestic sales and foreign exports are chosen by firms depends on the
available public information in the economy. In our paper we take this important feature into
account: taking the prior distribution of the random spot exchange rate as given, we model
the uncertainty in an open economy through an information system that conveys signals
about the foreign exchange rate. If the information system is more precise, the random spot
exchange rate can be assessed more accurately, thereby reducing the uncertainty faced by
the firm.1
Assuming that risk sharing arrangements exist whereby exporting and importing firms
can hedge their exchange rate risk exposure, an exogenous reduction in ex-ante uncertainty
(dispersion of the prior distribution) is not the same as a decline of ex-interim uncertainty
due to a more precise information system. In fact, the greater reliability of the information
signals may change the terms of trade on the risk sharing markets and thus affect firms’
trading decisions. Due to this interaction, standard models of international firms do not
1While we use the notions ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ interchangeably, we distinguish between ex-ante un-
certainty that refers to the prior distribution of the random spot exchange rate, and ex-interim uncertainty
that refers to the distribution conditional on a signal observation.
Transparency and Risk Sharing in International Trade 3
properly capture the mechanisms through which information-induced changes of uncertainty
affect the optimal behavior of firms.
We consider the financial market for foreign currency to be more transparent if it is
endowed with a more reliable information system about the risky exchange rate. As argued
above, in general higher transparency is not equivalent to a reduction of ex-ante exchange
rate uncertainty. Instead, our transparency concept is linked to the reliability of a publicly
observable signal that is correlated with the random foreign exchange rate. By conveying
some noisy information about the unknown exchange rate, the signal allows the international
firm to update its beliefs in a Bayesian manner. The foreign currency market is said to be
more transparent if the signal is ‘less noisy’, i.e., if it conveys more reliable information.
Within this setting our analysis focuses on the activity of a risk-averse international
firm, i.e., the firm is selling at home and abroad. To incorporate risk sharing, we assume
that the firm has access to a futures market where it can hedge the exchange rate risk
conditional on the realization of the public signal. We demonstrate that the impact of more
precise information on the firm’s ex-ante allocation of production to domestic and foreign
markets depends on the marginal revenue and marginal cost functions. In particular, more
transparency reduces the firm’s expected exports if the domestic marginal revenue and
marginal cost functions are convex. In any case, more transparency in the foreign exchange
market leads to higher expected profits of the firm. Furthermore our results suggest that
transparency is potentially beneficial to all, domestic consumers and the domestic exporting
firm.
Before turning to the analysis, let us place our contribution in the broader context of
the literature on international trade and investment decisions under uncertainty. By the
choice of the transparency criterion, our study is conceptually related to the literature on
the modeling and analysis of information structure along the lines of Blackwell (1953).
According to Blackwell’s approach, an information structure generates random observable
signals that are correlated with the unknown future state of the world. The precision of
these signals affects the uncertainty under which agents make their choices. This strand
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of literature has analyzed the link between the precision of information structure, optimal
individual behavior, and economic welfare both in partial equilibrium settings (Sulganik and
Zilcha, 1997; Wakker, 1988) and in general equilibrium settings (Citanna and Villanacci,
2000; Eckwert and Zilcha, 2001, 2003; Green, 1981; Hirshleifer, 1971, 1975).
Our paper is also related to the literature on the optimal choice under uncertainty with
incomplete risk sharing arrangements. This literature has investigated in various market
settings the role of specific risk factors on the behavior of risk-averse economic agents.
By focusing on the intertemporal nature of investment decisions, more recent studies have
pointed out that traditional investment rules can be misleading if they fail to properly
take into account the opportunity cost of investing (Thijssen et al., 2006). Our paper also
builds, of course, on the literature on the modeling of an international firm. This literature
describes how a firm acts in global markets (Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Kawai and Zilcha, 1986;
Wong, 2003). Typically, the firm is modeled as a risk-averse agent who tries to diversify
the risk and charges a risk premium on those risks that cannot be diversified.
In light of the extant literature, the contribution of the current paper is to analyze
an international firm’s behavior when uncertainty and terms of risk sharing vary with the
precision of an information system. In the literature, there are different analytical concepts
measuring the degree of information and proposing an order of the underlying information
systems (Blackwell, 1953; Kim, 1995; Lehmann, 1988). The notion of transparency used in
our study is adopted from the work by Eckwert and Zilcha (2001, 2003). They character-
ize market transparency by using a criterion that is conceptually related to the literature
emerged from the seminal work by Blackwell (1953).2 More transparency or more reliable
information means that market participants can make better economic decisions. When
the information is of public nature, rather than privately owned by an individual, it will
be used by all agents. Under such circumstances the information may affect endogenous
market mechanisms (Morris and Shin, 2002; Schlee, 2001).
There is a large body of literature which analyzes the welfare effects of public informa-
2For other concepts of transparency that have been used in the literature, see Heinemann and Illing
(2002) and Krebs (2005).
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tion. When individuals make decisions in isolation from others, more reliable information is
generally beneficial (Blackwell, 1953). Yet, more information can have detrimental effects
if the information affects risk sharing arrangements in the economy (Hirshleifer 1971, 1975;
Schlee, 2001) or if agents interact strategically using private information and public infor-
mation simultaneously. In this paper we abstract from informational asymmetries but we
allow for some risk sharing through a competitive currency futures market. While market
transparency does not affect the risk premium on this market, it does have implications for
the amount of risk that will be shared in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of an inter-
national firm under exchange rate uncertainty. In section 3, we introduce the concept of
information-based risk that underlies the analysis. Section 4 derives the main results. In
section 5, we present a numerical example in order to illustrate and to quantify the impact
of transparency on the expected level of output. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an international firm that makes decisions under exchange rate uncertainty. There
is one period with two dates, indexed by t = 0 and 1. The firm is risk averse and possesses
a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u(π), defined over its home currency profit,
π, at t = 1, where u′(π) > 0 and u′′(π) < 0 for all π > 0.
At t = 0, the firm produces a single homogeneous good in the home country according
to a known cost function, c(q), where q ≥ 0 is the level of output, c(0) = c′(0) = 0, and
c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0 for all q > 0.3 The firm also has to decide how to allocate its
entire output, q, between domestic sales and foreign exports. Specifically, the firm commits
to selling s units of the good in the home market and exporting the rest, x = q − s, to a
foreign country at t = 1, where 0 ≤ s ≤ q.
The firm enjoys some monopoly power in the home market wherein it faces a known
3The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the firm’s production technology exhibits
decreasing returns to scale.
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revenue function, r(s), denominated in the home currency with r(0) = 0, and r′(s) > 0 and
r′′(s) < 0 for all s ≥ 0. The firm, however, is a price taker in the foreign market wherein
it sells at a fixed per unit price, p > 0, denominated in the foreign currency.4 Due to the
segmentation of the home and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either impossible
or unprofitable, thereby invalidating the law of one price.5
We model the exchange rate uncertainty by a random variable, ẽ, that denotes the spot
exchange rate at t = 1 and is expressed in units of the home currency per unit of the foreign
currency.6 The realization of ẽ is not known until t = 1. The firm, however, holds a prior
belief that ẽ is distributed according to a probability density function, f(e), over support
[e, e] at t = 0, where 0 < e < e.
There is a public signal, ỹ, released by the government or the central bank at t = 0
before the firm makes any decisions. Let n(y) be the prior probability density function of ỹ
over support [y, y], where y < y. The signal, ỹ, is correlated with the random spot exchange
rate, ẽ, and thus contains valuable information about ẽ. The firm updates its belief in a
Bayesian manner. Let ν(e|y) be the posterior probability density function of ẽ conditioned
on ỹ = y over support [e, e]. After observing the realized public signal, y, the firm makes
its decisions based on ν(e|y) at t = 0.
The firm has access to a foreign exchange futures market for hedging purposes. The
foreign exchange futures market opens at t = 0 after the public signal has been revealed. Let
ef be the futures exchange rate that is determined at t = 0 and is expressed in units of the
home currency per unit of the foreign currency. We assume that risk-neutral arbitrageurs
are active in the foreign exchange futures market so that
ef =
∫ e
e
eν(e|y) de, (1)
4If the firm also has market power in the foreign country, the concavity of the marginal cost function
continues to be sufficient for a positive impact of transparency on average output (cf. Proposition 1). Yet,
this condition is no longer necessary. In fact, even with convex marginal production costs more transparency
may raise the average output level. Similarly, convexity of the marginal cost function constitutes a necessary,
but no longer sufficient condition for an inverse link between transparency and average output.
5Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and Wei (1996) provide supportive evidence that arbitrage
transactions among national markets are indeed imperfect.
6Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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for all y ∈ [y, y]. It is evident from Eq. (1) that the unbiased futures exchange rate, ef , is
a linear function of the posterior probability density function, ν(e|y).
The firm’s profit at t = 1, denominated in the home currency, is given by
π̃ = r(s) + ẽpx − c(s + x) + (ef − ẽ)h, (2)
where h is the number of the unbiased foreign exchange futures contracts sold (purchased
if negative) by the firm at t = 0. Conditional on the realized public signal, y, the firm’s
decision problem at t = 0 is to choose a level of domestic sales, s, a level of foreign exports,
x, and a futures position, h, so as to maximize the expected utility of its random home
currency profit at t = 1:
max
s≥0,x≥0,h
∫ e
e
u[r(s) + epx − c(s + x) + (ef − e)h]ν(e|y) de. (3)
Figure 1 depicts how the sequence of events unfolds in the model.
0 1
The public signal is observed.
The firm makes its production, sales
allocation, and hedging decisions.
The spot exchange rate is realized.
The firm sells its output and
settles its futures position.
Figure 1. Time Line
The first-order conditions for program (3) are given by
∫ e
e
u′[r(s∗) + epx∗ − c(s∗ + x∗) + (ef − e)h
∗][r′(s∗)− c′(s∗ + x∗)]ν(e|y) de = 0, (4)
∫ e
e
u′[r(s∗) + epx∗ − c(s∗ + x∗) + (ef − e)h
∗][ep − c′(s∗ + x∗)]ν(e|y) de = 0, (5)
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and
∫ e
e
u′[r(s∗) + epx∗ − c(s∗ + x∗) + (ef − e)h
∗](ef − e)ν(e|y) de = 0, (6)
where an asterisk indicates an optimal level. If h∗ = px∗, the firm’s home currency profit
at t = 1 becomes r(s∗) + efpx
∗ − c(s∗ + x∗), which does not depend on ẽ. It then follows
from Eq. (1) that Eq. (6) is satisfied at h∗ = px∗. In this case, Eqs. (4) and (5) reduce to
r′(s∗) − c′(s∗ + x∗) = 0, (7)
and
efp − c
′(s∗ + x∗) = 0. (8)
Hence, we establish the well-known separation and full-hedging results in our model (Broll
and Zilcha, 1992; Kawai and Zilcha, 1986; Wong, 2003).
3 Transparency and Information Systems
We follow Eckwert and Zilcha (2001, 2003) to define the transparency in the foreign exchange
market by the informativeness of the signal, ỹ, that is publicly observable at t = 0. In
practice, the signal may represent the projection of an expert (the central bank or a research
institution) on the future path of the spot exchange rate. The noisiness of the signal reflects
forecasting errors. The signal may also be the information about other economic variables
such as the fiscal and monetary policy and the foreign exchange position of the central
bank. The noisiness of the signal comes from the imprecise relation between those economic
variables and the prevailing spot exchange rate.
The informativeness of the signal depends on the information system within which sig-
nals can be interpreted. An information system, denoted by g, specifies a set of conditional
probability density functions of ỹ, {g(y|e) : e ∈ [e, e]}, over support [y, y]. This set of con-
ditional probability density functions, according to which signals are generated for a given
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spot exchange rate, is common knowledge. The firm acts in a Bayesian manner to revise
its expectations and maximizes its expected utility on the basis of the updated belief.
Given the information system, g, we can write the prior probability density function of
ỹ as
n(y) =
∫ e
e
g(y|e)f(e) de, (9)
for all y ∈ [y, y]. By Bayes’ rule, we can use Eq. (9) to write the posterior probability
density function of ẽ conditioned on ỹ = y as
ν(e|y) =
g(y|e)f(e)
n(y)
, (10)
for all y ∈ [y, y]. The following criterion that ranks different information systems according
to their informational contents is adopted from Blackwell (1953).
Definition 1. Let g1 and g2 be two information systems. g1 is said to be more informative
than g2 if there exists an integrable function, λ(y′, y) : [y, y] × [y, y] → IR+, such that
∫ y
y
λ(y′, y) dy′ = 1, (11)
holds for all y ∈ [y, y], and
g2(y′|e) =
∫ y
y
g1(y|e)λ(y′, y) dy, (12)
holds for all e ∈ [e, e].
According to Definition 1, g1 is more informative than g2 if the latter can be obtained
from the former through a process of randomization. Eq. (11) implies that λ(y′, y) can be
interpreted as a probability density function of ỹ′ over support [y, y] for a given value of
y. Eq. (12) describes the course of the randomization process that transforms the original
signal, ỹ, into a new signal, ỹ′, via the probability density function, λ(y′, y). If the y′-values
are generated in this way, the information system, g2, can be interpreted as being obtained
from the information system, g1, by adding random noise. Since λ(y′, y) does not depend
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on e, the signals under g2 contain no new information about the realization of ẽ that has
not been conveyed by the signals under g1. As a consequence, the conditional exchange
rate uncertainty under g1 must be lower than that under g2.
As an example, we assume that the random spot exchange rate, ẽ, takes on one of two
possible values, e1 and e2, such that 0 < e1 < e2 and f(e1) = f(e2) = 1/2. The public
signal, ỹ, takes on one of two possible values, y1 and y2, with y1 < y2. The information
system, g, is defined by a pair of conditional probability density functions of ỹ such that
g(y1|e1) = g(y2|e2) = γ and g(y1|e2) = g(y2|e1) = 1−γ, where γ ∈ [1/2, 1] is a constant. The
prior probability density function of ỹ is given by n(y) = g(y|e1)f(e1) + g(y|e2)f(e2) = 1/2
for y ∈ {y1, y2}. Let g
1 and g2 be the information systems when γ = 1 and γ = 1/2,
respectively. Under g1, we have ef = ei when the public signal is yi for i = 1 and 2.
There is no conditional exchange rate uncertainty so that g1 signifies a fully informative
information system. On the other hand, under g2, we have ef = (e1 + e2)/2 irrespective
of the signal. The conditional exchange rate uncertainty remains the same as the prior so
that g2 signifies a completely uninformative information system.
Consider the function, λ(y′, y), such that λ(y1, y) = λ(y2, y) = 1/2 for y ∈ {y1, y2}.
Then, we have g2(y′|e1) = g
1(y1|e1)λ(y
′, y1) + g
1(y2|e1)λ(y
′, y2) = 1/2, and g
2(y′|e2) =
g1(y1|e2)λ(y
′, y1) + g
1(y2|e2)λ(y
′, y2) = 1/2 for y
′ ∈ {y1, y2}. It follows immediately from
Definition 1 that g1 is more informative than g2. Since g1 is a fully informative informa-
tion system while g2 is a completely uninformative information system, g1 is indeed more
informative than g2.
Our notion of transparency in the foreign exchange market is based on the informational
content of the signal. A signal that conveys information about the random spot exchange
rate affects the conditional exchange rate uncertainty in the economy. We characterize the
foreign exchange market as more transparent if the signal conveys more information about ẽ.
Thus, higher market transparency implies that the conditional exchange rate uncertainty is
reduced through the dissemination of more reliable information, which leads to the following
definition.
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Definition 2. Let g1 and g2 be two information systems for the random spot exchange rate,
ẽ. The foreign exchange market is said to be more transparent under g1 than under g2 if g1
is more informative than g2.
It follows from Definitions 1 and 2 that higher transparency reduces the dispersion of
the conditional spot exchange rate distribution. However, higher transparency involves no
bias as it does not affect the unconditional expected spot exchange rate. To see this, we
use Eq. (12) to get
∫ y
y
g2(y′|e) dy′ =
∫ y
y
∫ y
y
g1(y|e)λ(y′, y) dy dy′ =
∫ y
y
g1(y|e) dy, (13)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (11). Using Eq. (1), we have the unconditional
expected spot exchange rate:
∫ y
y
[
∫ e
e
eν(e|y) de
]
n(y) dy =
∫ e
e
ef(e)
[
∫ y
y
g(y|e) dy
]
de, (14)
where the equality follows from Eq. (10). It then follows from Eqs. (13) and (14) that the
unconditional expected spot exchange rate is invariant to different information systems.
The following lemma formulates an alternative transparency criterion that is in accord
with Definition 2. It provides a convenient practical tool for the analysis of our model.
Lemma 1. The foreign exchange market is more transparent under the information system,
g1, than under the information system, g2, if, and only if,
∫ y
y
F [ν1(·|y)]n1(y) dy >
∫ y
y
F [ν2(·|y)]n2(y) dy, (15)
for every strictly convex function, F (·), defined on the set of posterior probability density
functions of ẽ over support [e, e].
A formal proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Kihlstrom (1984). Note that ν1(·|y) and
ν2(·|y) are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems. Thus, Lemma 1 implies
that more transparency raises the expectation of any strictly convex function of the posterior
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belief. For strictly concave functions, inequality (15) is reversed. It is worthwhile pointing
out that the convexity of F (·) in Lemma 1 is defined on the posterior belief and not on the
realization of the signal. As such, higher transparency neither implies nor is implied by the
second-order stochastic dominance of the signal distribution.
4 International Allocations and Welfare Implications
In this section, we perform the comparative statics with respect to the futures exchange
rate, ef . To this end, we write Eqs. (7) and (8) as
r′[s∗(ef)] − c
′[s∗(ef ) + x
∗(ef)] = 0, (16)
and
efp − c
′[s∗(ef) + x
∗(ef )] = 0. (17)
Differentiating Eqs. (16) and (17) with respect to ef yields
s∗′(ef ) =
p
r′′[s∗(ef)]
< 0, (18)
x∗′(ef) =
p
c′′[s∗(ef ) + x∗(ef)]
−
p
r′′[s∗(ef)]
> 0, (19)
and
q∗′(ef) = s
∗′(ef ) + x
∗′(ef ) =
p
c′′[q∗(ef )]
> 0. (20)
Thus, an increase in the futures exchange rate, ef , increases the levels of exports and output
but decreases the amount of domestic sales.
Denote q∗ as the expected level of output. Then, we have
q∗ =
∫ y
y
q∗(ef )n(y) dy. (21)
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Proposition 1 characterizes the link between the expected level of output and the trans-
parency in the foreign exchange market by imposing restrictions on the cost function, c(q).
Proposition 1. More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to a higher (lower)
expected level of output if, and only if, the marginal cost function, c′(q), is strictly concave
(convex).
Proof. It is evident from Eq. (1) that ef is a linear function of the posterior probability
density function, ν(e|y). Lemma 1 and Eq. (21) imply that the average level of output
increases (decreases) with more transparency in the foreign exchange market if, and only if,
q∗(ef) is strictly convex (concave) in ef . Differentiating Eq. (20) with respect to ef yields
q∗′′(ef ) = −
p2c′′′[q∗(ef)]
c′′[q∗(ef)]3
, (22)
where we have used Eq. (20). The desired results follow immediately from Eq. (22). 2
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. With more transparency, good signals
lead to an increase in output, while bad signals lead to a decrease in output. When the
marginal cost is increasing at a decreasing (an increasing) rate, the increase in output in
response to a good signal is larger (smaller) than the decrease in output in response to a
bad signal. As such, the average level of output goes up (down) when the marginal cost
function is strictly concave (convex).
The above result depends on the third derivative of the cost function. To gain further
insight into this restriction, we consider the firm that has a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, q(K, L) = KαLβ, where K is the capital stock, L is the labor input, and α and β are
positive constants with α+β < 1 so that the firm’s production technology exhibits decreas-
ing returns to scale. If the unit cost of capital and that of labor are ρ and w, respectively,
it is easily verified the firm’s cost function, c(q), is given by
c(q) = (α + β)
(
ρ
α
)α/(α+β) (w
β
)β/(α+β)
q1/(α+β). (23)
Eq. (23) implies that c′(q) is strictly concave or convex, depending on whether α + β is
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larger or smaller than 1/2, respectively. In this example, more transparency in the foreign
exchange market reduces or enhances the expected level of output, depending on whether
the firm’s production technology exhibits sufficient decreasing returns to scale or not.
Denote s∗ as the expected level of domestic sales. Then, we have
s∗ =
∫ y
y
s∗(ef )n(y) dy. (24)
Proposition 2 characterizes the link between the expected level of domestic sales and the
transparency in the foreign exchange market by imposing restrictions on the revenue func-
tion, r(s).
Proposition 2. More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to a higher (lower)
expected level of domestic sales if, and only if, the marginal revenue function, r′(s), is strictly
convex (concave).
Proof. By Eq. (1), ef is linear in the posterior belief, ν(·|y). It follows from Lemma
1 and Eq. (24 that the expected level of domestic sales increases (decreases) with more
transparency if, and only if, s∗(ef) is strictly convex (concave) in ef . Differentiating Eq.
(18) with respect to ef yields
s∗′′(ef) = −
p2r′′′[s∗(ef)]
r′′[s∗(ef)]3
. (25)
The desired results follow immediately from Eq. (25). 2
Since x = q − s, the expected level of foreign exports is given by
x∗ =
∫ y
y
x∗(ef )n(y) dy = q∗ − s∗. (26)
Applying the results from Propositions 1 and 2 to Eq. (26), we establish the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to a higher (lower)
expected level of foreign exports if both the marginal revenue function, r′(s), and the marginal
cost function, c′(q), are strictly concave (convex).
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Since the full-hedging theorem holds in that the firm’s optimal futures position is a
full-hedge, i.e., h∗ = px∗, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to a higher (lower)
expected volume of hedging if both the marginal revenue function, r′(s), and the marginal
cost function, c′(q), are strictly concave (convex).
While the effects of more transparency on production, sales allocation, and hedging
decisions depend crucially on the parametric specifications of the model, we show in the
following proposition that more transparency unambiguously raises the firm’s expected
profit.
Proposition 3. More transparency in the foreign exchange market always leads to an
increase in the expected profit of the firm.
Proof. Proceeding along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 1, we need to show
that
π∗(ef) = r[s
∗(ef )] + efpx
∗(ef) − c[s
∗(ef ) + x
∗(ef )], (27)
is strictly convex in ef . Differentiating Eq. (27) with respect to ef yields
π∗′(ef ) = px
∗(ef) > 0, (28)
where we have used Eqs. (7) and (8). Differentiating Eq. (28) again yields
π∗′′(ef ) = px
∗′(ef ) > 0, (29)
where we have used Eq. (19). The claim then follows from Eq. (29). 2
To see the intuition for Proposition 3, we have
π∗′(ef ) =
∂π∗(ef )
∂s∗(ef )
s∗′ +
∂π∗(ef )
∂x∗(ef)
x∗′(ef) +
∂π∗(ef)
∂ef
=
∂π∗(ef )
∂ef
= px∗(ef). (30)
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An increase in ef has a first-order effect on the firm’s maximum profit through the export
revenues, px∗(ef ). Since the firm exports more when ef increases, this first-order effect on
π∗(ef ) is stronger for a larger value of ef and weaker for a lower value of ef . As a result, the
firm’s profit function is convex in ef . A more transparent foreign exchange market makes
ef more sensitive to changes in the public signal, thereby leading to higher expected profits.
Finally, we turn to the welfare implication of more transparency in the foreign exchange
market for domestic consumers. Let D(s) be the strictly decreasing inverse demand for the
homogeneous good in the home market, where s is the amount of domestic sales. Since
r(s) = D(s)s, the domestic consumers’ surplus can be written as
CS(ef) =
∫ s∗(ef )
0
D(s) ds − D[s∗(ef )]s
∗(ef ). (31)
We measure consumer welfare by the expected level of the domestic consumers’ surplus:
CS =
∫ y
y
CS(ef )n(y) dy. (32)
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which more transparency in
the foreign exchange market promotes consumer welfare.
Proposition 4. More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to a higher ex-
pected level of the domestic consumers’ surplus if the inverse demand function, D(s), is
weakly concave and the marginal revenue function, r′(s), is weakly convex.
Proof. Proceeding along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 1, we need to show
that CS(ef ) is strictly convex in ef . Using Leibniz’s rule to differentiate Eq. (31) with
respect to ef yields
CS ′(ef) = −
pD′[s∗(ef)]s
∗(ef)
r′′[s∗(ef)]
, (33)
where we have used Eq. (18). Differentiating Eq. (33) with respect to ef yields
CS ′′(ef ) = −
p2D′[s∗(ef )]
r′′[s∗(ef )]2
{
1 − s∗(ef )
r′′′[s∗(ef)]
r′′[s∗(ef)]
+ s∗(ef )
D′′[s∗(ef )]
D′[s∗(ef )]
}
. (34)
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The claim then follows from Eq. (34). 2
Propositions 3 and 4 suggest that more transparency in the foreign exchange market may
lead to a Pareto improvement in that both the international firm and domestic consumers
are made better off.7 This findings are in stark contrast to the more pessimistic assessments
of the value of information in risk sharing markets derived by Eckwert and Zilcha (2003)
and Schlee (2001).
5 A Numerical Example
In this section, we consider the two-state example as described in Section 3. The random
spot exchange rate, ẽ, takes on one of two possible values, e1 and e2, such that 0 < e1 < e2
and f(e1) = f(e2) = 1/2. The public signal, ỹ, takes on one of two possible values, y1 and
y2, with y1 < y2. The information system, g, is defined by g(y1|e1) = g(y2|e2) = γ and
g(y1|e2) = g(y2|e1) = 1 − γ, where γ ∈ [1/2, 1] measures the informativeness of g. The
pair of the conditional probability density functions of ẽ are therefore given by ν(e1|y1) =
ν(e2|y2) = γ and ν(e2|y1) = ν(e1|y2) = 1− γ. It follows that ef (y1) = e1 + (e2 − e1)(1− γ)
and ef (y2) = e1 + (e2 − e1)γ.
We assume that the firm’s cost function is given by c(q) = qσ/σ, where σ is a constant
greater than unity. Solving Eq. (17) yields q∗(ef ) = (efp)
1/(σ−1). Eq. (21) becomes
q∗ =
p1/(σ−1)
2
{
[e1 + (e2 − e1)(1− γ)]
1/(σ−1) + [e1 + (e2 − e1)γ]
1/(σ−1)
}
. (35)
We compare the expected level of output when the foreign exchange market is fully trans-
parent (i.e., γ = 1), and that when the foreign exchange market is completely opaque (i.e.,
γ = 1/2). Setting γ = 1 in Eq. (35) yields
q∗full =
p1/(σ−1)
2
[
e
1/(σ−1)
1 + e
1/(σ−1)
2
]
, (36)
7For example, more transparency in the foreign exchange market improves consumer welfare should the
inverse demand function be linear.
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in the transparent foreign exchange market. Setting γ = 1/2 in Eq. (35) yields
q∗null = p
1/(σ−1)
(
e1 + e2
2
)1/(σ−1)
, (37)
in the opaque foreign exchange market. Since the function k(a) = a1/(σ−1) is strictly
convex (concave) if σ < (>) 2, it follows from Jensen’s inequality and Eqs. (36) and (37)
that q∗full > (<) q
∗
null. These results are consistent with those of Proposition 1 since c
′(q)
is strictly concave (convex) if σ < (>) 2.
To quantify the effect of more transparency on output, we set e1 = 5, e2 = 15, and
σ = 11/10. In this case, q∗full/q
∗
null = 28.8. Thus, the expected level of output in the
transparent foreign exchange market is almost 28 times higher than that in the opaque
foreign exchange market. If σ takes values exceeding 2, then q∗full/q
∗
null is smaller than 1
but larger than 0.95. In this case, more transparency reduces the expected level of output
but the effect tends to be trivial.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework that integrates market transparency, risk
sharing opportunities, and resource allocations in an open economy under exchange rate
risk. The aim of our study is to discuss the economic implications of more transparency in
the foreign exchange market. The uncertainty to which the international firm is exposed
when it decides on resource allocations between domestic and international markets depends
on the observed signal as well as on the information system within which the signal can be
interpreted. We characterize the foreign exchange market as more transparent if the signal
conveys more precise information about the unknown foreign exchange rate. Thus, more
information means that the exchange rate uncertainty is reduced through the disclosure of
more reliable information.
We show that the effect of more transparency on the ex-ante allocation of production
to domestic and foreign markets depends on the marginal revenue and marginal cost func-
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tions. In particular, more transparency leads to a higher expected level of production if the
marginal cost function is concave. More transparency leads to a higher expected level of
exports if both the domestic marginal revenue function and the marginal cost function are
concave. We also show that more transparency always leads to an increase in the expected
profit of firm. Furthermore we demonstrate that more transparency may lead to a higher
consumer surplus. Our results thus suggest that more market transparency is potentially
beneficial in a Pareto sense.
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